In practical decoy-state quantum key distribution, the raw key length is finite. Thus, deviation of the estimated single photon yield and single photon error rate from their respective true values due to finite sample size can seriously lower the provably secure key rate R. Current method to obtain a lower bound of R follows an indirect path by first bounding the yields and error rates both conditioned on the type of decoy used. These bounds are then used to deduce the single photon yield and error rate, which in turn are used to calculate a lower bound of the key rate R. Here I show how to directly compute a lower bound of R via McDiarmid inequality in statistics. This method increases the provably secure key rate of realistic quantum channels by at least 30% when the raw key length is ≈ 10 5 to 10 6 . More importantly, this is achieved by pure theoretical analysis without altering the experimental setup or the post-processing method. In a boarder context, this work introduces powerful concentration inequality techniques in statistics to tackle physics problem beyond straightforward statistical data analysis.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two trusted parties Alice and Bob to share a provably secure secret key by preparing and measuring quantum states that are transmitted through a noisy channel controlled by an eavesdropper Eve. One of the major challenges to make QKD practical is to increase the number of secure bits generated per second [1] . That is why most QKD experiments to date use photons as the quantum information carriers; and these photons come from phase randomize Poissonian distributed sources instead of the much less efficient single photon sources. In addition, decoy state method is used to combat Eve's photon-number-splitting attack on multiple photon events emitted from the Poissonian sources [2, 3] . From the theoretical point of view, a more convenient figure of merit is the key rate, namely, the number of provably secure secret bits per average number of photon pulses prepared by Alice. This is because key rate measures the intrinsic performance of a QKD protocol (in other words, the software issue) without taking the frequency of the pulse (which is a hardware issue) into account.
Provably secure lower bounds of key rates (I refer them as simply as key rates from now on) for various QKD schemes for the realistic situation of finite raw key length have been reported. For instance, Lim et al. [4] computed the key rates of a certain implementation of the BB84 QKD scheme [5] using three types of decoy; recently, Chau [6] extended it to the case of using more than three types of decoys. Hayashi and Nakayama studied the key rate for the BB84 scheme [7] . And Brádler et al. showed the key rate for a qudit-based QKD scheme using up to three mutually unbiased preparation and measurement bases [8] . Note that these key rates are found using the following three-step strategy. First, the yields Q B,µn and error rates E B,µn conditioned on the preparation and measurement basis B as well as the photon intensity parameter µ n used are determined by comparing the relevant Bob's measurement outcomes, if any, with Alice's preparation states. The second step is to deduce yields and error rates conditioned on the number of photons emitted by the source. Recall that for a phase randomized Poissonian photon source,
and
Here, µ 1 > µ 2 > ⋯ > µ k ≥ 0 are the photon intensities used in the decoy method with k ≥ 2. Moreover, Y B,m is the probability of photon detection by Bob given that the photon pulse sent by Alice contains m photons and e B,m is the bit error rate for m photon emission events prepared in the B basis [2, 3, 9] . The key rate R depends on Y B,0 , Y B,1 and e B,1 [2] [3] [4] 9] . Nevertheless, the later quantities cannot be determined precisely because Eqs. (1) and (2) are under-determined systems of equations given Q B,µn 's and E B,µn 's provided that the number of decoys k is finite. To make things worse, in the finiteraw-key-length (FRKL) situation, the measured values of Q B,µn 's and E B,µn 's deviate from their true values due to finite sampling. Fortunately, effective lower bounds of Y B,0 and Y B,1 as well as upper bound of e B,1 are available [2-4, 6, 9, 10] . In the FRKL situation, these bounds can be deduced with the help of Hoeffding inequality [11] .
(See, for example, Refs. [4, 6] for details.) The third step is to deduce R from these bounds [2-4, 8, 9] . Computing lower bound of R using this indirect strategy is not satisfactory in the FRKL situation because it is unlikely for each of the finite-size fluctuations in Q B,µn 's and E B,µn 's to decrease the value of the provably secure key rate. In fact, for a given security parameter, the worst case bounds on Y B,0 and Y B,1 cannot be not attained simultaneously if the raw key length is finite. (This is evident, say, from the bounds of Y B,0 and Y B,1 given by Inequalities (2) and (3) in Ref. [4] or Inequalities (12a) and (12b) in Ref. [6] . Note that there is a typo in Inequality (12b) -the Q ⟪k0−i⟫ B,µi there should be
. In all cases, the finite-size statistical fluctuation that leads to the saturation of lower bound for Y B,0 does not cause the saturation of the lower bound for Y B,1 and vice versa.)
It is more effective if one could directly investigate the influence of finite-key-length on the key rate. To do so, one has to go beyond the use of Hoeffding inequality to bound the statistical fluctuation, which only works for equally weighted sum of random variables that are either statistical independent or drawn from a finite population without replacement [11] . Here I use the computation of the key rate of a specific BB84 QKD protocol [5] that generates the raw key solely from X basis measurement results as an example to illustrate how to directly tackle statistical fluctuation in the FRKL situation by means of McDiarmid inequality [12] in statistics. The technique used here can be easily adapted to compute the key rates of other QKD schemes using finite-dimensional qudits in the FRKL situation.
Recall that the error rate for this particular BB84 QKD scheme is lower-bounded by [4, 6] 
where p X denotes the probability that Alice (Bob) uses X as the preparation (measurement) basis, ⟨f (µ)⟩ ≡ ∑ k n=1 p µn f (µ n ) with p µn being the probability for Alice to use photon intensity parameter µ n . Furthermore,
is the binary entropy function, e p is the phase error rate of the single photon events in the raw key, and Λ EC is the actual number of bits of information that leaks to Eve as Alice and Bob perform error correction on their raw bits. It is given by
if they use the most efficient (classical) error correcting code to do the job. In addition, ℓ raw is the raw sifted key length measured in bits, ǫ cor is the upper bound of the chance that the final secret keys shared between Alice and Bob are different, Eve's information on the final key is at most ǫ sec [13] [14] [15] , and χ(k) is a QKD scheme specific factor depending on the number of photon intensities k together with the detailed security analysis used.
For BB84, e p → e Z,1 as ℓ raw → +∞. More importantly, the best known bound on the difference between e p and e Z,1 due to finite sample size correction using properties of the hypergeometric distribution reported in given by [6, 16] 
with probability at least 1 − ǫ sec χ(k), wherē
and s B is the number of bits that are prepared and measured in B basis. Clearly, s X = ℓ raw and
(Note thatγ becomes complex if a, c, d are too large. This is because in this case no e p ≥ e Z,1 exists with failure probability a. I carefully picked parameters here so thatγ is real.)
In the infinite-key-length limit, statistical fluctuations of Q B,µn and E B,µn can be ignored. Then based on the analysis in Ref. [6] with typos corrected, one has
where k 0 = 1(2) if k is even (odd), and∏ j≠n is over the dummy variable j from k 0 to k but skipping n. In addition,Ŝ n = ∑ ′′ µ t1 µ t2 ⋯µ t k−k 0 −1 where the double primed sum is over k 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 < ⋯ < t k−k0−1 ≤ k with t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k−k0−1 ≠ n. (In other words, a 01 = a 21 = 0 if k is odd and a 11 = 0 if k is even.) Substituting Inequalities (5) and (7) into Expression (3) gives the following lower bound of the key rate
where
can be dealt with in the same way by changing the definition of b n accordingly. But these cases are not interesting for normally they imply R = 0 in realistic channels.)
Note that the worst case key rate corresponds to the situation that the spin flip and phase shift errors in the raw key are uncorrelated so that Alice and Bob cannot use the correlation information to increase the efficiency of entanglement distillation. Thus, I may separately consider statistical fluctuations in Q X,µn 's, e p in the FRKL situation. This can be done by using McDiarmid inequality. Actually, this inequality was first proven using martingale technique in Ref. [12] for the case of statistically independent random variables. The version I use here is the extension to statistically dependent random variables reported in Ref. [17] . (See also a closely related version in Ref. [18] .)
. . , W n ) be a family of possibly statistically dependent random variables with W i taking values in the set W i for all i. Let f be a bounded real-valued function of W. For a fixed i = 1, 2, . . . , n, let w i ∈ W i and set
where E[f ] is the expectation value of f , and B i denotes the conditions
i , where the supremum is over all w ∈ ∏ W i . Then
for any δ > 0.
From the R.H.S. of Inequalities (5) and (7), I obtain
A naive way to study the statistical fluctuation of e Z,1 is to regard Q Z,µn 's and Q Z,µn E Z,µn 's as random variables and directly apply Theorem 1 to the R.H.S. of the above inequality. However, it does not work for the R.H.S. of this inequality need not be bounded. Instead, I first write Q Z,µn = ∑ jWnj s Z,µn wheres Z,µn is the number of photon pulses that Alice prepares using photon intensity µ n and that Alice prepares and Bob tries to measure (but may or may not have detection) in Z basis. In addition,W nj denotes the possibly correlated random variable whose value is 1 (0) if the jth photon pulse among thes Z,µn photon pulses is (not) detected by Bob. Clearly, s Z,µn ≈ T p 2 Z p µn with T being the total number of photon pulses sent by Alice and p Z = 1 − p X is the probability for Alice (Bob) to prepare (measure) in the Z basis. Since
Here W Z,i is the random variable that takes the value a 1n p µn if the ith photon pulse that are prepared by Alice and then successfully measured by Bob both in the Z basis is in fact prepared using photon intensity µ n . Recall that Eve knows the number of photons in each pulse and may act accordingly. However, she does not know the photon intensity parameter used in each pulse and the preparation basis until the pulse is measured by Bob. Hence, W Z,n 's may be correlated. Actually, the most general situation is that W Z,n 's are drawn from a larger population without replacement. That is to say, these random variables obey the multivariate hypergeometric distribution.
For multivaritate hypergeometric distribution,r 2 in Eq. (11) of Theorem 1 is very difficult to compute. Fortunately, it can be upper-bounded as follows. Inspired by Ref. [18] , I define the following. It is straightforward to check that multivariate hypergeometrically distributed W Z,i 's form a centering sequence with respect to the function ∑ sZ i=1 W Z,i . As a consequence, Theorem 1 implies that the true value of ∑ k n=1 a 1n Q Z,µn is less than the observed value by
) with probability at most ǫ Z , where Width(S) of a bounded set S of real numbers is defined as sup S − inf S.
By the same token,
where W e Z,i is a random variable taking value of a 2n p µn if the ith photon pulse that is prepared and successfully measured in the Z basis and that the measurement result is different from the preparation (in which there are totally s e Z ≈ T p 2 Z ⟨Q Z,µ E Z,µ ⟩ such pulses) is in fact prepared using photon intensity µ n . Hence, with probability at most ǫ e Z , the true value of ∑ k n=1 a 2n Q Z,µn E Z,µn is greater than the observed value by
Since W e Zi and W Z,j are positively correlated, with probability at least 1 − ǫ Z − ǫ e Z − ǫγ, the phase error rate e p is upper-bounded by the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) where
To study the statistical fluctuation of R, it remains to consider the fluctuation of Q X,µn in the first term in Expression (8) . (Although the second term also depends on Q X,µn 's implicitly through Λ EC , statistical fluctuation is absent from this term. This is because Λ EC is the amount of information leaking to Eve during classical post-processing of the measured raw bits. Thus, it depends on the observed values of Q X,µn 's and E X,µn 's instead of their true values.) Using the same technique as in the estimation of statistical fluctuation in e p , the first term of Expression (8) . Here b n is given by Eq. (9) with e p equals the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) where e Z,1 satisfies Eq. (13). Theorem 1 implies that due to statistical fluctuation, the true value of the first term in Expression (8) ) with probability at most ǫ X .
Putting everything together and by setting ǫ X = ǫ Z = ǫ e Z = ǫγ = ǫ sec χ(k), I conclude that the secret key rate R satisfies
where b n = b n (e p ) is given by Eq. (9) . Here e p equals the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) with e Z,1 given by Eq. (13). Interestingly, χ(k) = 9 = 41 + 4 is independent on the number of photon intensities k used. (Here the first number 4 comes from the generalized chain rule for smooth entropy in Ref. [4] , the number 1 comes from the finite-size correction of the raw key in Eq. (B1) of Ref. [4] , and the last number 4 comes from ǫ X , ǫ Z , ǫ e Z and ǫγ through the use of McDiarmid inequality [17] and hypergeometric distribution bound in Ref. [16] .) Although χ does not depend on k for this method, it does not mean that one could use arbitrarily large number of photon intensities as decoys without adversely affecting the key rate for a fixed finite s X . The reason is that Width({a 1n p µn } k n=1 }), Width({a 2n p µn } k n=1 }) and Width({b n p µn } k n=1 }) diverge as k → +∞ due to divergence of a 1n , a 2n and b n [6] as well as the decrease in min{p µn } k n=1 . Recall that computing a 1n , a 2n and b n is numerically stable and with minimal lost in precision if µ n − µ n+1 ≳ 0.1 for n = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 [6] . This means the number of photon intensities k used in practice should be ≲ 10.
To evaluate the performance of this new key rate formula in realistic situation, I consider the quantum channel with Q B,µ ≈ (1 + p ap )(2p dc + η sys µ) and Q B,µ E B,µ ≈ (1 + p ap )p dc + (e mis η ch + p ap η sys 2)µ for 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, which is a commonly used channel model for dedicated-opticalfiber-based QKD experiments. Here I fix after pulse probability p ap = 4 × 10 −2 , dark count probability p dc = 6 × 10 −7 , error rate of the optical system e mis = 5 × 10 −3 , transmittances of the fiber and the system η ch = 1 × 10 −2 and η sys = 1 × 10 −3 . These parameters are obtained from optical fiber experiment on a 100 km long fiber in Ref. [19] ; and have been used in Refs. [4, 6] to study the performance of decoy-state QKD in the FRKL situation. I also follow Refs. [4, 6] by using the following security parameters: ǫ cor = κ = 10 −15 , where ǫ sec = κℓ final with ℓ final ≈ Rs X (p 2 X ⟨Q X,µ ⟩) is the length of the final key measured in bits. Note that κ can be interpreted as the secrecy leakage per final secret bit. Table I compares the optimized key rates for the stateof-the-art method reported recently Eq. (3) of Ref. [6] with Eq. (14) for various s X and k. The optimized rates are found by fixing the minimum photon intensity to 1×10 −6 , while maximizing over p X as well as all other photon intensities µ n 's and all the p µn 's. The table clearly shows that using McDiarmid inequality improves the optimized key rates in all cases. In terms of the percentage increase in key rate, the smaller the raw key length s X , the better the improvement. (And the improvement vanishes as s X → +∞.) For s X ≈ 10 [6] with the key rate in Eq. (14) (or more precisely R−5 ≡ max(0, R × 10 −5 )) for the dedicated quantum channel used in Refs. [4, 6] . These rate are optimized using the method stated in the main text.
tical QKD because the computational and time costs for classical post-processing can be quite high when the raw key length s X is long. More importantly, the McDiarmid inequality method reported here is effective to increase the key rate of real or close to real time on demand generation of the secret key -an application that is possible in near future with the advancement of laser technology.
In addition to QKD, powerful concentration inequalities in statistics such as McDiarmid inequality could also be used beyond straightforward statistical data analysis. One possibility is to use it to construct model independent test for physics experiments that involve a large number of parameters but with relatively few data points. This work is supported by the RGC grant 17304716 of the Hong Kong SAR Government. I would like to thank Joseph K. C. Ng for his discussions on the McDiarmid inequality and K.-B. Luk for his discussion on potential applications of McDiarmid inequality in physics.
